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Do Punitive Damages
Compensate Society?

MICHAEL B. KELLY*

As a retributive device, punitive damages are problematic. Retribution
usually is a function of the criminal law, where criminal procedure offers
defendants considerable safeguards against unjust punishment. By
moving punishment into the realm of civil actions, punitive damages
circumvent those safeguards.1
The uneasy case for civil punishment may explain the quest to justify
punitive damages on bases other than retribution. The origin of punitive
damages may in fact be compensatory rather than punitive. Judges
crafted the category of exemplary damages as a justification for
* Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D. 1983, University of
Michigan; M.A. 1980, University of Illinois-Chicago; B.G.S. 1975, University of
Michigan. I would like to thank Shaun Martin, Frank Partnoy, Chris Wonnell, and
Donald Dripps for their assistance with the Article.
1. This Article does not contend that the circumvention violates the law. The
Supreme Court has held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does
not limit the power of state courts to award punitive damages in actions between private
parties, where the state neither prosecutes the claim nor has any right to receive a portion
of the proceeds. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 264
(1989). Still, the Supreme Court has shared the uneasiness that results when sanctions
traditionally imposed by criminal law find their way into civil actions. See United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446–49 (1989) (holding that a civil action brought by federal
government following criminal prosecution was limited by the Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy clause), overruled by 522 U.S. 93 (1997). Some state supreme courts share
uneasiness about circumventing limitations on punishment. “Thus, the focus of the
clause is on the impact of the punishment to the individual. We do not believe the State
can make an end run around the Excessive Fines Clause by simply making a punishment
payable to a victim.” State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 547–51 (Iowa 2000) (ruling
that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does limit victim restitution award
of $150,000 imposed as part of a criminal sentence, but affirming the award as not
excessive) (internal citation omitted).
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affirming jury awards that exceeded the tangible losses when the award
seemed appropriate given other losses not then compensable under the
law.2 Once the law began to compensate for insult, indignity, and distress,
the need to circumvent the restrictions on recovery disappeared. But the
doctrine, originally explained as a punishment to deter, remained.
Today, efforts to justify punitive damages as compensatory—or at
least to avoid describing them as retributive—continue. One of the most
intriguing is a work by Catherine M. Sharkey entitled Punitive Damages
as Societal Damages.3 Professor Sharkey suggests that punitive damages,
to some degree in some cases, actually assess damages incurred by
members of society who are not parties to any legal action to recover
them. The assessment of damages in excess of the plaintiff’s own losses
may serve as compensation for the losses others suffer but that otherwise
will not be recovered from the defendant.
Professor Sharkey reads this purpose in two related changes in
punitive damages. From a theoretical standpoint, she draws on deterrence
theories. In suggesting that defendants never compensate victims for
many of the harms defendants cause, these articles identify a shortfall in
the traditional compensatory damages defendants pay.4 To the extent
that this shortfall helps justify punitive damages, the assessment takes on
a less retributive flavor, even if not exactly a compensatory flavor.
Because punitive damages may not be directed toward the victims who
suffered the uncompensated losses, that compensatory note may sound a
bit hollow. Professor Sharkey’s second insight responds, at least in part.
From a practical standpoint, she notes a number of jurisdictions that
require a substantial portion of punitive damages to be paid to the state.5
Diverting funds to the public puts them to use for the benefit of society,
not the individual plaintiff. To the extent that punitive damages do
represent losses caused to but not recovered by people other than this
2. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 10–19 (1982).
3. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J.
347 (2003).
4. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 366–67. Deterrence theory urges that defendants
should internalize all the costs their misconduct causes. That will create an incentive to
prevent those losses if the harms exceed the cost of preventing them, but will not
encourage inefficient prevention (when the cost of prevention exceeds the harm to be
prevented). See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 11, 11–15 (1991). If, however, defendants escape paying the full cost of
the harms they cause, they will internalize too little of the cost, and their incentive to
prevent the harms will be too small. David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for
Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 271–72 (1989).
5. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 375–80; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West
1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2) (West 1998); Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145–46 (Ohio 2002).
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plaintiff, the state serves as a surrogate for the members of the public
who were not adequately compensated. This portion of the punitive
award, then, compensates the public for harms done to the public.
Having identified the theory, Professor Sharkey goes further to
suggest that the funds could be directed to the individual victims of the
defendant’s wrongdoing. She suggests two ways to achieve this. She
suggests a new damages-only class certification, at which other people’s
claims could be proven. This procedure would allow the uncompensated
losses to provide the measure of defendant’s additional damage liability,
in addition to serving as a conduit to the persons whose need for
compensation justifies the assessment. Alternatively, funds could be
directed to a program that serves the needs of people most likely to be
victims. For instance, punitive damages for sexual harassment might be
used to train defendant’s supervisors on harassment issues. Punitive
damages in an insurance case might be directed to the state insurance
commissioner for use in monitoring and prosecuting inappropriate
insurance business practices. These suggestions for redirecting punitive
damages away from the plaintiff are interesting, but comment on them
would considerably lengthen this Article. Instead, I want to focus on the
theory itself, the concept that punitive damages can be justified as a
substitute for compensatory damages for harms caused by the defendant
to persons other than the plaintiff.
This paper concludes that punitive damages are a poor device for
redressing harms caused to persons not a party to the action. Punitive
damages certainly have a role to play in deterring pure malice.6 How far
beyond malice punitive damages should go—and whether they should
be imposed by civil rather than criminal procedure—are open to debate.
But once punitive damages seek to address concerns beyond the plaintiff
and the defendant, they raise a series of problems that defy rationalization.
Considering the harm to society may justify larger awards by circumventing
limitations inherent in redressing the wrong to only one plaintiff. But no
sound justification exists for using punitive damages in this way.7
6. No matter what else punitive damages may do, they should offset any
malicious glee a defendant takes from causing harm to another. While malicious glee
may be a benefit to the defendant, society should afford that benefit no weight in
determining the costs and benefits of misconduct.
7. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (“In
sum, courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and
proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages
recovered.”) (emphasis added).
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Let me distinguish two other theories that, though related, are not the
subject of this Article. One holds that punitive damages compensate the
plaintiff for losses that damage rules do not satisfy. The American rule
on attorneys’ fees leaves plaintiff undercompensated if she recovers
exactly the amount of her loss.8 Rules on certainty and foreseeability
may preclude recovery of some losses caused by the breach. Rules that
limit plaintiff to the market value of property may underestimate the true
loss to the plaintiff.9 The problems with this argument are well known.
These factors are not limited to cases in which defendant acted intentionally
or recklessly. Thus, punitive damages will correct these shortcomings in
only a small percentage of cases. In addition, punitive damages are not
measured by the amount of the shortcoming, but by the amount
necessary to deter similar misconduct in the future. Thus, punitive damages
may exceed these uncompensated losses (or, in some cases, may not
cover the uncompensated losses).10 Finally, and perhaps most important,
to the extent that these limitations serve legitimate purposes, circumventing
them via punitive damages undermines those purposes. Whatever may
be said against these doctrines, it seems preferable to address them
directly and amend or eliminate them as appropriate. In any event, my
comments below have no import to efforts to compensate the plaintiff in
the case for losses that she suffered. This Article addresses only the
implication that punitive damages can be justified as a means of assessing
defendant with damages suffered by persons who were not party to the
action.
A second related theory notes that punitive damages may resemble
restitution. In some cases, juries appear to determine the extent of the
benefit that defendant reaped by its wrongful conduct and to assess that

8. Whether the plaintiff’s attorney is paid a portion of the award on a contingency
or recovers an hourly fee, the plaintiff’s net recovery is less than her full loss.
9. Arguably, any owner who was not trying to sell the property probably
valued it more highly than prospective buyers. There are many qualifications on
this insight. The owner might misperceive prospective buyers’ willingness to pay.
The owner might value the property less than others, but the expected cost of sale
might exceed the gains from the trade. An owner who might value the property
relatively little might not advert to the possibility of sale. Still, limiting owners to
objective value often will undercompensate them, even though allowing subjective value
risks overcompensating them.
10. In City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986), the total damages were
$33,350, including punitive damages. Id. at 564–65. Neither the opinions nor the briefs
in the case reveal the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages. Perhaps the punitive
damages would have covered the attorney’s 33% contingency fee. Still, there is room to
suspect that the punitive award was a relatively modest portion of the recovery, perhaps
too little to cover the attorney’s contingency. Because the case involved a fee shifting
statute, plaintiffs recovered over $245,000 in attorney’s fees, id. at 565, surely a more
direct way to address undercompensation.
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amount as punitive damages.11 While not compensatory, the recovery
also is not exactly punitive. It applies restitution principles to remove
defendant’s gain. In a proper case, a jury might be instructed to do just
that. Typically, however, one would not award restitution on top of an
award of compensatory damages. Nor is disgorgement of benefits always
the measure of restitution. Finally, when restitution is large enough to
be punitive, it may involve aggregating the restitution claims of many
persons.12 To the extent that the restitution approach seeks recovery on
behalf of persons not represented in the suit, some of the comments
below may apply equally to it. But my comments continue to focus on
plaintiff’s losses, not defendant’s gains.
Assessing punitive damages in the amount of compensation to
nonparties may seem too obvious a target. Merely stating that the award
includes amounts allegedly lost by persons not party to the action will
impeach the idea for some. But respectable authorities urge that damage
awards can and should exceed the amount needed to compensate the
plaintiff’s losses in order to make up for the inability of some victims to
recover.13 That position stems from a criticism that compensatory
damages underdeter—not because the plaintiff’s own losses are
undercompensated, but because many of the losses a defendant may
cause never mature into damage judgments. If some persons do not
recover from the defendant for the harms defendant caused, defendant
has too little incentive to invest in prevention.14 That is particularly true
when defendant can anticipate that some of the claims either will fail or
will never be brought. In order to achieve optimal deterrence, then,
persons who do recover should be awarded more than their actual
losses—by just enough to cover the losses to people whose claims
defendant otherwise might escape.
As an economic theory, the point is relatively sound. Indeed, the
criticism often comes from the other direction—from people who
11. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App.
1981) (discussing the jury’s punitive award of $125 million (arguably based on the
amount Ford saved by not making fuel tank safer) which was remitted to $3.5 million).
12. In Grimshaw, for example, the $125 million punitive damage award represents
a relatively small savings per car on millions of cars sold. Presumably, the benefit to
Ford from the plaintiff was only a small portion of the total benefit. The total
accumulates the restitution claims of all buyers, not just the plaintiff.
13. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 887–96 (1998).
14. See Leebron, supra note 4.
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believe the theory unduly limits punitive damages, rather than from
people who believe the theory unduly justifies them.15 But when reduced to
practice, the theory threatens to trammel due process. The theory, for
instance, has a counterpart in criminal law, where it suggests imposing
really large punishments on criminals we catch easily in order to achieve
greater deterrence for the least amount of law enforcement resources.16
Whatever the societal benefits by way of deterrence, it seems a bit odd to
treat criminal defendants as fungible, such that punishing one more than
she deserves offsets punishing another less than she deserves. Or
perhaps economic models of criminal law simply do not appeal.
As applied to punitive damages, the theory may not treat defendants as
fungible. Societal compensatory damages rest on the assumption that
the defendant’s conduct has more than one victim. In cases of products
liability, that commonly will be true. In cases where the misconduct
arises from a policy—a discriminatory hiring policy, a policy of denying
insurance claims regardless of the merits—the policy often will affect
more than one person. The goal is to assess defendant for the harms it
caused to others, not for harms others caused by similar misconduct. To
that extent, at least, the theory maintains credibility.
Nonetheless, due process problems arise. Three deserve discussion:
(1) ascertaining the merits of the absent person’s claim, (2) ascertaining
the proper recipient of the absent person’s claim, and (3) protecting the
rights of the absent person’s potential future claims.
The first problem—identifying the merits of the absent person’s
claim—is the greatest. Defendants often harm multiple individuals.
Some of those harmed may not prevail, even if their claims are
meritorious.17 But the problems that prevent persons from recovering on
their own claim also make it very difficult to include their claims in the
plaintiff’s quest for punitive (or societal) damages. Whether one seeks
to estimate the other losses in the aggregate (as by formula)18 or
15. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
17. The victim may never discover some claims. The victim may elect not to
bring some claims even if known. The victim may lose some filed claims on
technicalities unrelated to the merits (such as the statute of limitations). The victim may
lose other filed claims on the merits, despite the need to include those losses in order to
achieve optimal deterrence (economic loss doctrine).
18. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
415 (2003), the Utah Supreme Court reinstated an award of $145 million in punitive
damages (over a trial court’s remittitur to $25 million) in part because “State Farm will
only be punished in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability.”
Id. at 426. For deterrence purposes, the rate at which State Farm would be compelled to
pay compensatory damages would be more important than the rate at which it will be
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individually (Professor Sharkey’s damages-only class), the problem
remains determining how many of the uncompensated claims there are
and how many actually deserve compensation.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell19 offers an
interesting case study. On its face, it seems to present an appealing case
for increasing plaintiff’s recovery in light of other claims. State Farm
denied Campbell’s insurance claim in part due to its Performance,
Planning & Review (PP&R) program, a policy aimed at increasing
profits by reducing the cost of paying claims.20 By aiming the policy at
“the weakest of the herd,” State Farm tried to exploit the possibility that
some victims would not sue by singling out exactly those least likely to
bring a claim.21 The case virtually calls out for augmenting damages to
make up for the inability of compensatory damages to deter adequately.
The minute one attempts to put a number on the claims, however,
problems emerge. While State Farm’s policy seems to call for rejection
of meritorious claims, it undoubtedly calls for rejection of meritless
claims. The damages to society, thus, include only a subset of the claims
State Farm rejected. State Farm is unlikely to keep records revealing
which claims were denied on the merits and which were denied despite
the merits. Indeed, all such claims will be denied on the merits; some
denials are bad decisions on the merits, but all will masquerade as
legitimate denials. One might resolve any uncertainty against State Farm.
Having formulated a policy that encouraged denying meritorious claims,
State Farm created uncertainty as to the merits of all claims it rejected.
Resolving uncertainty by presumption, however, usually follows efforts
to resolve uncertainty by evidence. Only when evidence fails to
establish an issue with sufficient certainty is it necessary to resort to a
presumption.22 Thus, before assessing State Farm with damages designed
to compensate other victims, it deserves some opportunity to show that
the other alleged victims were not damaged by a legal wrong.

punished. Nonetheless, an estimate of the rate of unsuccessful claims was used to justify
a larger recovery in this successful claim. The U.S. Supreme Court found $145 million
in punitive damages to be excessive and suggested to the Utah courts an amount at or
near the $1 million compensatory award. Id. at 429.
19. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 408.
20. Id. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22. This applies to any rebuttable presumption. Regardless of where the burden of
persuasion ultimately falls, evidence on the issue may be admitted by either party.
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Even once the number of improper rejections is known, the amount of
harm caused by each rejection must be calculated. While some claims
may involve set amounts (the death benefit in a life insurance policy, for
example), other claims will involve disputed amounts (the value of
property destroyed by a fire), and still others will involve nonpecuniary
amounts (the distress suffered as a result of denying the claim). In
Campbell, the entire claim was for distress. Although State Farm refused a
settlement and initially refused to cover the excess judgment against its
insured, it eventually paid all pecuniary losses before suit. The bad faith
claim involved only the distress suffered because of these initial refusals
to pay. The jury assessed that distress at $2.6 million.23 But a jury will
have considerably more difficulty assessing the distress of persons not
before the court. Even if the conduct that allegedly caused the distress
can be presented without the victim’s testimony, the severity of the
effect upon each victim cannot be ascertained with any confidence.
My objection is only partially practical. To a large degree, my concern is
with due process. While a formula might be devised to estimate the
extent of harm wrongfully caused by State Farm’s misconduct, that
formula engages in presumptions about the merits of other potential
cases. Some of these potential cases have not been brought to court and,
thus, never proven to the satisfaction of the legal system. Worse, some
of the cases have been brought to court and have been resolved by the
legal system, but resolved against the plaintiffs for reasons that do not
alter the desire to deter defendants. The decision to include other people’s
claims (whether unsuccessful or unbrought) in the plaintiff’s claim
circumvents all the requirements of bringing and proving an action. In
effect, due process for defendant simply falls from the equation.24
Perhaps insurance bad faith claims are too easy a target. Consider,
then, a product liability case, in which all claims involve an identical
design defect. The Ford Pinto cases make a good illustration.25 The
design defect made the Pinto more prone than most similar cars to leak
fuel or burn when hit from behind. We may assume (arguendo) that the
issue of whether the Pinto was defective should be resolved the same
way in every case.26 But that will not necessarily mean that every
23. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 412–16. The trial court subsequently reduced this
compensatory damage award to $1 million. Unlike the trial court’s reduction of the
punitive award, the compensatory reduction was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. Id.
at 415.
24. Yes, defendant does get due process in the claim brought by this one plaintiff.
But if one plaintiff could establish the rights of all others, without evidence relating to
the claims of others, class actions would be unnecessary. The circumvention here is
significant.
25. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
26. Juries might disagree on the issue of defect for any number of idiosyncratic
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person injured by fire in a rear end collision should recover from Ford.
Causation remains an issue: some fires might have occurred even if the
Pinto had a state-of-the-art design (as when the accident occurs at speeds
that even the best tank cannot withstand). Contributory negligence (or a
similar defense) might play a part either in liability or in damages (if the
rear-end collision was caused by the Pinto driver’s negligence).27
Finally, even if liability is clear, the amount to include as damages for
other victims may be unclear. The severity of injuries may vary among
the accidents. Even within the most severe cases, damages for death and
total disability vary greatly with the earning capacity of the victim.
Perhaps the example is, again, poorly chosen. With injuries this
severe and a defect this well publicized, perhaps everyone will bring an
individual suit, leaving no hole for societal compensatory damages to
fill.28 If so, then societal compensation offers no justification for punitive
damages in these cases. Perhaps a less severe injury, such as the damaged
paint in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,29 leaves more room for
societal compensation. But the problems of assessing how many others to
include in compensation remain. BMW raised the difficulty of conduct
that was not wrongful in most states.30 It also raises the second issue for
discussion: determining the proper beneficiary of the absent person’s
claim.
Societal damages seek to protect claims that others could have brought
even if they did not bring them. Where the harms to the plaintiff are
relatively modest, there are many reasons that people might choose not
reasons. Variations among the states in the definition of defect might lead an identical
jury hearing identical evidence to produce different results. Differences in rules on
admissibility might compound the variations. Still, each car had an identical design; it
seems odd to contend that one was defective while an identical car was not. For
purposes of discussion, therefore, this Article assumes uniform results on this aspect of
the cases.
27. Indeed, Ford won at least one of the claims brought alleging injuries from burn
after a rear-end collision. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1030 n.66 (1991) (citing a report by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA)).
28. Gary Schwartz reported data gathered by the NHTSA. A total of thirty-eight
accidents involved fuel leakage or fire after a Pinto suffered a rear end collision. These
produced twenty-seven deaths and twenty-four nonfatal burns, resulting in twenty-nine
lawsuits. Id. at 1030 & n.66. Some of the cases involved more than one victim;
Grimshaw, for example, involved two people. Id. at 1016. Thus, twenty-nine lawsuits
might include all fifty-one victims.
29. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1996).
30. Id. at 569 n.13.
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to pursue their own claim. Some of these reasons suggest the victim’s
intent to allow the defendant to keep any unpaid portion of the claim.
That is clearest with settlements, where the plaintiff waives any claim to
a greater amount in return for immediate (and undisputed) entitlement to
a lesser amount. Settlements may not comport with the economist’s
desire for full internalization. Yet it is difficult to assert that the
remainder of the loss should be recovered in a different plaintiff’s suit.
Whatever amount plaintiff left on the table, defendant bargained for it
and plaintiff accepted the bargain. It belongs to defendant, not some
third party.
Another reason involves forgiveness. Some victims believe in forgiving
those who sin against them. That forgiveness is a gift to the defendant.
It is not a gift to a subsequent plaintiff, to the state, to a charitable
organization, or to any other person who might receive the proceeds of
societal compensatory damages. To redirect it undermines the plaintiff’s
act of forgiveness.
Arguably, even victims who want to sue but find the cost prohibitive
intend a gift to the defendant.31 These victims weigh the cost to
themselves against the prospect of letting the defendant keep whatever
they might recover in a suit. In deciding not to sue, these victims know
to a substantial certainty that the defendant retains the potential
damages. No matter how much society might wish that these plaintiffs
had instead aggregated their claim with the claims of other plaintiffs,
setting aside the decision not to proceed arguably alters the allocation of
rights and benefits the victim created.
Perhaps none of these is insurmountable. With a less costly procedure
(such as the damages-only class proposed by Professor Sharkey), some
people might press their claims rather than let defendant off the hook.
More globally, perhaps society should be allowed to use other people’s
potential claims to achieve its deterrence goals, even if that involves
overriding those people’s wishes, express or implied. Trumping individual
wishes seems problematic. To my knowledge, no one has proposed that
waivers, gifts, settlements, or other techniques whereby defendants are
released from liability violate public policy.32 One imagines a practical
difficulty of persuading people to testify about their claims if they have
31. Cost here is not limited to pecuniary costs. The cost in time and emotional
stress of engaging in litigation may dissuade some persons from bringing suits.
32. Contract law once could have justified that position. The preexisting duty rule
could be deployed to argue that a release given in exchange for a settlement lacked
consideration if the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for more than the settlement
amount. Modern weakening of the rule makes clear that a release can be valid even if
defendant would have been held liable for a greater sum had the case proceeded to trial.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (1981).
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decided not to undertake the cost (whether due to settlement contract,
inertia, or forgiveness). The decision to assess the damages incurred by
one victim and incorporate them into another victim’s suit seems to
require some consent (at least a failure to opt out) from the first victim.
Societal damages, either as an assessment technique or as a rationale for
punitive damages, make no effort to take these wishes into account.
A third due process problem is that societal damages risk endangering
other victims’ potential future claims. Societal damages change over
time. Each time a new case is decided, the uncompensated portion of
societal damages decreases.33 Thus, the amount of uncompensated
societal compensatory damages depends on the number of claims that
have already been concluded. More importantly, however, the amount
also depends on the number of claims that will be concluded. If
individual claims will be concluded in the future, the assessment of
societal compensatory damages should not include the amounts at issue
in those future claims. Even more problematic, the amount of societal
damages assessed in one case should vary with the amount of societal
damages collected in other cases, both past and future.
Perhaps claims already brought can be identified and excluded from
consideration when calculating societal damages.34 Future claims are
much more difficult to anticipate and evaluate. Including the losses
these future cases might claim in today’s action forces one of two
undesirable results: the future plaintiff may be denied recovery on the
ground that defendant has already paid that loss; or the defendant will be
compelled to pay the damages twice, once in the societal damage award
in the earlier action and again to the future plaintiff. Paying twice
produces overdeterrence. Denying the future claim works a hardship, if
not an injustice, on the victim whose claim is denied.35
33. If plaintiff wins, the damages are compensated, bringing defendant closer to
full internalization of costs. If plaintiff loses on the merits, the damages are not
attributable to defendant’s wrong, thus forming no part of the loss to society that
defendant should internalize. The assertion in the text may be slightly overstated, given
the possibility that plaintiff might lose despite presenting a meritorious claim.
34. There is room to suspect that some claims will escape notice. Perhaps
defendants will reveal claims already made in an effort to limit the amount of societal
damages for which it might be held liable. That flies in the face of common practice,
seeking to prevent the jury from knowing about other similar claims. Cf. FED. R. EVID.
403, 404(b).
35. This problem can arise in any class action. The limitations on recognizing
class actions seek to minimize any injustice that might result. Professor Sharkey, in
proposing damages-only classes, seeks to include these mechanisms in her proposal.
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One last point deserves note. The problem of underdeterrence due to
unsuccessful claims is not limited to cases where punitive damages
might be available. Even when no intentional or reckless misconduct
can be proven, victims who do not bring claims or who do not prevail on
them may prevent internalization of all of the costs of defendant’s
misconduct. The theory of societal damages, thus, proves too much.
Rather than justifying punitive damages, it justifies group compensatory
damages in a broad array of settings.36
That idea has emerged in some cases. Class representatives sometimes
ask a court to assess the entire amount that the defendant owes for
losses, then let the class distribute it appropriately among the members.37
Courts have been reluctant to take that approach.38 Sometimes a
classwide settlement may produce a fund that exceeds the claims made
by the identifiable members of the class, producing a residual amount
that the court may administer. But a court assessing damages in a class
action rarely assesses the total losses in the abstract. Rather, when
damages are individual, a class judgment of liability engenders
individual claims for specific amounts, which must be proven as with
any other claim for damages in court.39 Courts are reluctant to create
remedies that might be distributed to persons who were not the victims
of the original wrong.40 Indeed, even when the parties are before the
The issue addressed here, however, is whether a compensatory rationale can explain
punitive damages, not whether a new form of class action might evolve to take care of
the same problem.
36. One might argue that underdeterrence, while suboptimal in any case, is
intolerable in cases involving intentional or reckless misconduct. The greater importance
of deterring these greater wrongs justifies a more aggressive stance, despite the due
process concerns. This position seems to move the justification back toward retribution,
letting state of mind, not undercompensation, differentiate the cases where additional
deterrence is needed. At the very least, the argument raises questions about the true role
underdeterrence plays in the mix.
37. See, e.g., Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1256–57 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the trial court correctly refused to award class-wide judgment
after finding liability), cert. granted in part, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6696.
38. The court in Allapattah noted several obstacles to calculating damages on a
class-wide basis:
These obstacles include (1) accounting for those [plaintiffs] who either have
opted out of the class or not submitted claims; (2) accounting for those
[plaintiffs] whose claims were barred by the Ohio statute of limitations; (3) the
difficulty of awarding prejudgment interest on a class-wide basis when the
applicable amount of interest varies from state to state; and (4) determining
whether the dealers’ claims are subject to further reduction by set-off claims
asserted by Exxon.
Id. at 1257.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973)
(rejecting a fluid recovery concept to bypass the manageability requirement for class
actions), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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court, efforts to assess damages on a general or group basis are subject
to criticism.41 These doctrines stand in the way of any effort to
reconceptualize punitive damages as a form of class compensation.
When proposed directly, this form of class compensation has been
rejected. Using punitive damages as a way to circumvent the procedural
restrictions on this form of compensation should raise a red flag.
That red flag may be the central point of this Article. As the core
theories of punitive damages face more criticism and more restrictions,
theorists reach farther afield to find new justifications for the continued
existence of this recovery. Each new justification seems to be an effort
to circumvent or distort civil procedure. Punitive damages may dodge
the American rule on attorneys’ fees, the difficulty of certifying class
actions, the technicalities of the statute of limitations, the transaction
costs of litigation, and other components of the litigation process. Yet
punitive damages do nothing to confront the problems created by (or
solved by) these rules. Rather, punitive damages undermine efforts to
correct these problems. They serve as a safety valve, releasing the steam
that otherwise might propel changes to these rules—or that otherwise
might dissipate in the face of the value of these rules. By diverting
attention from the source of the problems, punitive damages don’t solve
anything (or don’t solve enough).
These arguments, of course, do not have implications for other
justifications of punitive damages. That is a work for other articles or,
perhaps, for the Supreme Court. One senses a relationship between
recent developments in the Supreme Court and the efforts to find new
justifications for punitive damages. When confined to rationales like
retribution, punitive damages may be more limited than they have been
in the recent past.42 That may concern persons who believe the threat of
41. See, e.g., United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir. 1958)
(awarding each plaintiff identical amounts for distress).
Apparently the court found a total amount which should be awarded to all
plaintiffs for pain and suffering, and divided it equally among them. There
was no more justification for such division than there would have been in
using the total value of the seized animals and dividing it equally among the
plaintiffs. Pain and suffering is a personal and individual matter, not a
common injury, and must be so treated.
Id. at 925.
42. Justice Ginsburg’s prediction that the Supreme Court’s pronouncements may
be difficult to administer suggests that the limits may be wishful thinking more than
actual change. If state courts search for ways to do exactly what they would have done
anyway, the Supreme Court may not be able to review enough cases to enforce its
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nearly unlimited punitive damages is essential to coerce good conduct by
large corporations. Thus, the effort to circumvent the limitations imposed
by the Supreme Court may begin by expanding the underlying rationale
for punitive damages.
This Article urges that we not take punitive damages as so great a good
that we run roughshod over due process in our zeal to preserve them.
Compensation to society, in order to be administered fairly, requires
more than a judgment in an individual suit followed by an expression of
outrage, no matter how well disguised in the cloak of compensation to
nonparties.

approach. If, however, state courts take the new promulgations seriously, some
reduction in the size of punitive awards may result.

1442

